Tug of Trade mark War and Courts of law in respect of Permitted User

As an IP Lawyer, I become a witness of many IP battles in the battlefield i.e. court of law. One of the battles is in respect of permitted user of the trade mark. Let me discuss it by way of writing this blog. The issue of this article is whether a permitted user  of a trade mark can file a suit for infringement action or passing off action  or can that permitted user be sued for infringement of a trade mark ? Let me divide this one issue in two parts for better discussion and understanding. 

1) Whether a permitted user  of a trade mark can file a suit for infringement action.

2)Whether a permitted user of a trade mark can file a suit for passing off action.

3) Whether a permitted user of a trade mark can be sued by another registered proprietor of a trade mark. 

Before I discuss the above mentioned issues herein below, it is necessary to know who can be a user of trade mark. First of all it is required to be discussed that who is user of trade mark. The user of the trade mark, in general terms, means a person who uses the trade mark for the purpose of his trade, business or service.  In trade mark law, there is no particular definition is given for 'user' of a trade mark, however, in legal sense, there are three persons who can be called 'user' of  trade mark.

 (1) a registered proprietor of a trade mark 
(2) a registered user of a trade mark and
(3) a permitted user of a trade mark. 

A registered proprietor is defined under section 2 (1)(v) of the Trade marks Act, 1999(the Act for short) whereas section 2 (1) (x) read with section 49 of the Act says about registered user and  section 2(1)(r) of the Act talks about permitted user. 

As the issue of this article revolves round 'permitted user',let me discuss the above mentioned issues one by one with the help of provisions of trade marks law and judicial pronouncements.

1) Whether a permitted user  of a trade mark can file a suit for infringement action.

First of all it is an essential point to know that who a  permitted user is. The information about who a permitted user is given in the form of 'permitted use' under Section 2(1)(r) of the Act which is as under.
(r) "permitted use", in relation to a registered trade mark, means the use of trade mark-

(i) by a registered user of the trade mark in relation to goods or services-

(a) with which he is connected in the course of trade; and

(b) in respect of which the trade mark remains registered for the time being; and

(c) for which he is registered as registered user; and

(d) which complies with any conditions or limitations to which the registration of registered user is subject; or

(ii) by a person other than the registered proprietor and registered user in relation to goods or services-

(a) with which he is connected in the course of trade; and

(b) in respect of which the trade mark remains registered for the time being; and

(c) by consent of such registered proprietor in a written agreement; and

(d) which complies with any conditions or limitations to which such user is subject and to which the registration of the trade mark is subject.

As per the above mentioned definition, it is clear that a person, who is given permission to use a  registered trade mark  in relation to goods or services in the course of trade, is a permitted user. Section 2(1)(r) is referred to a registered user and a person other than the registered proprietor and registered user. 

Coming back to the issue no. 1  whether a permitted user of a trade mark can file a suit for infringement action, the Section 53 of the Act itself is the answer of this issue which says that a person referred to in sub clause (ii) of clause (r) of subsection (1) of Section 2 shall have no right to institute any proceeding for any infringement.  Thus it is clear that the permitted user can not file a suit for infringement action.  In support of my view based on section 53 of the Act, I rely upon the judgement of Division Bench of Delhi High Court on 4th January, 2017 in the case of P.K. Sen vs. Exxon Mobile Corporation and Anr ; setting aside the Order passing by the single bench; Hon'ble DB of Delhi High Court in paragraph no. 16 of the judgement held that "Section 53 is clear departure from Section 52 of the Act which stipulates that a person referred to in Section 2(1)(r)(ii) shall have no right to institute any proceeding for any infringement. The person referred in Section 2(1)(r)(ii) is a person other than the registered proprietor and registered user and would obviously include a 'permitted user'. In other words, the only persons who can bring a suit for infringement of a trade mark would be registered proprietor himself or the registered user and certainly not permitted user. Therefore, in view of the Court, submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that the suit could not have been instituted by the respondent No.2/plaintiff no. 2 is correct."

2)Whether a permitted user of a trade mark can file a suit for passing off action.

With reference to this point, the Act is silent about instituting a suit for passing off action by a permitted user. When a person has a title of a property, he is entitled to give his property to be used by other person  as a permitted user. The passing off action is not a statutory remedy. It is a common law remedy, however, to institute a suit for any remedy whether infringement or passing off, title of the property must be acquired by the plaintiff. In other words, the person who institutes a suit must be owner of the trade mark. Permitted user is neither a registered proprietor nor a registered user. He is not an owner or proprietor of the property i.e. trade mark. A person is only entitled to file a suit when he has title and therefore, permitted user can not file a suit for passing off action. 

For instance, Mr. A is the proprietor or owner of the trade mark. Mr. B is a permitted user or a licencee of the trade mark of Mr. A. Mr. C is infringing the rights of Mr. A by using that trade mark in trade or business or service without licence or permission of Mr. A. 
Here in this case Mr. A is entitled to file a legal action against Mr. C as Mr. A is having a title i.e. ownership of that trade mark. Mr. B is not entitled to take any action against Mr. C as Mr. B does not have a title i.e. he is not an owner of that trade mark. 

3) Whether a permitted user of a trade mark can be sued by another registered proprietor of a trade mark. 

With reference to this point, it is important to quote here the judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case M/s Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd & Ors vs The Coca Cola Co. & Ors reported in 1995 AIR 2372, 1995 SCC(5) 545 wherein it was observed that it is permissible for the registered proprietor of a trade mark to permit a person to use his registered trade mark. Such licensing of trade mark is governed by common law and is permissible provided (i) the licensing does not result in causing confusion or deception among the public; (ii)it does not destroy the distinctiveness of the trade mark, that is to say, the trade mark, before the public eye,continues to distinguish the goods connected with others; and (iii) a connection in the course of trade consistent with the definition of trade mark continues to exist between the goods and the proprietor of the mark. [see : P. Narayanan = Law of Trade Marks and passing-Off, 4th Ed., para 20.16,p.335]. It would thus appear that use of a registered trade mark can be permitted to a registered user in accordance with provisions of the Act and for that purpose the registered proprietor has to enter into an agreement with the proposed registered user. The use of the trade mark can also be permitted dehors the provisions of the Act by grant of licence by the registered proprietor to the proposed user. Such a licence is governed by common law. 

In the above referred judgement it is observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court that the use of the trade mark by licencee of a registered proprietor can be made possible subject to the conditions that such licensing does not result in causing confusion or deception among the public. Now the question is when such licensing creates confusion or deception among people in respect of the trade mark of the third party, whether that third party can restrain that licencee from using that trade mark, the answer is in affirmative. The reason is agreement of licence between the licencor and licensee does not prevail over the statute irrespective of that fact that licensing falls under common law and such licensing is against the public interest. It is required to be noted that the concept of the trade mark since ages is to an indicator of exclusivity in trade under that mark and a licensee can be granted a limited right to use.  Use of a trade mark of third party is against the business ethics and dishonesty is reflected in the behaviour of the user of such trade mark. I would like to quote the landmark judgement of Hon'ble Supreme in case of Laxmikant V. Patel vs. Chetanbhai Shah and Another reported in (2002) 3 SCC 65 in support of my views in respect of business ethics. In paragraph no. 10 of this judgement Hon'ble Supreme Court is of the view that ......."the law does not permit any one to carry on his business in such a way as would persuade the customers or clients in believing that the goods or services belonging to someone else are his or are associated therewith. It does not matter whether the latter person does so fraudulently or otherwise. The reasons are two. Firstly, honesty and fair play are and ought to be the basic policies in the world of business. Secondly, when a person adopts or intends to adopt a name in connection with his business or services which is already belongs to someone else, it results in confusion and has propensity of diverting the customers and clients of someone else to himself and thereby resulting in injury."

Thus it is very clear that a licencee/ permitted user is using a trade mark under the licensing agreement and if that trade mark is in conflict with that of the third party, that third party who is an owner of the trade mark, is entitled to restrain the licencee of the trade mark whose use creates confusion and deception among people. Moreover, the very object of the trade mark Act is to establish the bridge between the goods and the source thereof. 
Chirag Bhatt
Partner- Litigation, Y.J.Trivedi &Co.

Classical Trinity - passing off action

As an IP lawyer I believe that awareness  must be spread in respect of intellectual  property  laws.  This article  is a part of knowledge  sharing  activity  with regard to passing  off action.

In my career as an IP lawyer, I have observed that a plaintiff is advised to  institute a suit for passing off action either separately  or a composite  suit wherein prayer for passing off action is normally  asked by the plaintiff along with other prayers.

Let me clarify that this article is based on the basic requirements to be established  by  the plaintiff even at interlocutory  stage for getting temporary injunction. Unless plaintiff fails to establish  the basic necessity,  injunction  can not be granted in favour  of plaintiff for passing off action. Such requirements  are called elements of passing off. In other words these elements of passing off are known as 'classical trinity'. It is the main point of  this article.

It is pertaining to note that passing off action belongs to common law remedies. It is not statutory  remedy, however, section 27(2) of the Trademarks Act, 1999 speaks about passing off action. Now the question  is what the common law remedy is. The common law remedy is based on ancient English laws established  by courts and customs of England. England is the mother of all laws.   The English judges established  the principle of  classical trinity i.e. ingredients  of passing  off action. This classical trinity was discussed in a case of Oertil v. Bowman reported in (1957) RPC 388. The English court explained  the classical trinity ( three elements) namely (1) goodwill established  by plaintiff (2) misrepresentation  made by defendant and (3) consequent Damage in suit for passing off action.  In another  case of Consorzio del Proscuitto vs. Marks & Spencer Plc. (1991) RPC 351 at 368, the English court reiterated the principle of classical trinity. In Reckitt & Coleman Products Ltd v. Borden Inc (No. 3) (1990) 1 WLR 491 at page 499, the classical trinity was discussed in respect of passinf off action , " The law of passing off can be summarized in one short general proposition - no man may pass off his goods as that of another. More specifically , it may be expressed  in terms of elements which the plaintiff in such an action has to prove in order to succeed. Three are three in numbers. First , he must establish a goodwill or reputation  attached to the goods or services which he supplies in the mind of purchasing  public by association with the identifying 'get up' ( whether it consists simply of a brand name or a trade description or individual  features  of labelling or packging) under which his particular  goods or services  are offered to the public. Such that the get up is recognised  by the public  as distinctive  specifically of the plaintiff's goods or services. Second,  misrepresentation was discussed. Misrepresentation made by the defendant to the public ( whether or not intentional) leading or likely to lead the public to believe that goods or services offered by him are the goods or services of the plaintiff. Whether the public is aware of the  plaintiff's  identity as the manufacturer  or supplier of goods or services  is immaterial,  as long as they are identified with a particular source which is in fact the plaintiff. Third, the plaintiff  must demonstrate that he suffers or in a quia timet action,  that he is likely to suffer damage by reason of the erroneous  belief engendered by the defendant's misrepresentation that the source of  the  defendant's  goods or services  is the same as the source of those offered by the plaintiff." The classical trinity is reiterated  by English court in case of Property Renaissance Ltd ( T/A Titanic Spa) vs. Stanley  Dock Hotel Ltd ( T/A Titanic Hotel Liverpool ) reported  in (2017) R.P.C. 12 Para 128 page 485 to discuss  the issue of  passing  off.

Hon'ble Supreme  Court of India has emphasized on the principle of  classical trinity in the well known case of Laxmikant V. Patel vs. Chetanbhai Shah and other reported in AIR 2002 SC 275 , last two lines of paragraph  no.12.  The said principle is also reiterated  by Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the latest judgement of Torrent Pharmaceuticals  Ltd vs. Wockhardt Limited reported in 2017 (70) PTC 215  Paragraph  44. Hon'ble Justice Patel discussed and justified  the issue of passing off action in view  of the classical trinity.

In my view a plaintiff must consider  that whether his case is within the purview  of the well  established  principle  of classical  trinity or not before filing of a suit for passing off action. Whether he is able to establish  the case of passing  off even at prima facie stage to restrain the defendant in view of the ingredients  of passing off i.e. 'classical trinity' as this trinity is the heart of passing  off action.

Chirag Bhatt

Advocate 

CBhatt Law Office 

Gandhinagar 

09824025041

Can a suit for groundless threat be transferred to High Court under Designs Act ?

As an IP lawyer I have come across an issue pertaining to transfer of a suit of groundless thereat under section 23 of the Designs Act, 2000 from District Court to High Court which stimulates me to write this blog. The question is whether a suit for groundless threat under Designs Act, 2000 can be transferred from District Court to High Court if the defendant institutes a counterclaim wherein he asks for infringement of his registered Design and challenges the validity of the design of the plaintiff.. This is the only issue in this article. Let me discuss it in detail. 

Let me travel from various provisions of Intellectual property laws with regard to groundless threat to reach the destination. In Trade marks Act, 1999 there is provision of groundless threat of legal proceedings under section 142 of the Act, however, there is no such provision of transferring  suit from District Court to High Court as are in Designs Act and Patent Act. In Copyright Act,1957 section 60 provides information about the remedy in the case of groundless threat of legal proceedings. In The Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act,1999, the issue of groundless threat is involved under section 73 of the Act. In these three Acts, the suit of groundless threat becomes infructuous  if a suit for infringement action is filed against the person who has filed a suit for groundless threat. The legal scenario in respect of the provisions of groundless threat is different in the Designs Act and Patent Act than that of the above mentioned three Acts. Let  it be discussed as under.

 Before I discuss about the provisions  related to groundless threats ,  is is essential to talk about the legal positions of the suit related to infringement of design and patent under Designs Act and Patent Act respectively. Section 22 of the Designs Act says that the registered proprietor of the Design is entitled to take a legal action against a person who is infringing the registered design for the purpose of sale by making any fraudulent or obvious imitation of the said registered design without taking any licence or written consent of the registered proprietor by instituting  a suit for damage and injunction against the person  in the District Court. In such a suit, if the defendant takes the defence that the registration of a design may be cancelled under section 19, the suit or other such other proceeding shall be transferred by the District Court to the High Court for decision. In the Patent Act,1970 according to the proviso  of section 104 where a counter-claim for revocation of the patent is made by the defendant, the suit, along with the counter-claim, shall be transferred to the High Court for decision.

Now coming back to the main point, Section 23 of Designs Act, 2000 speaks about the groundless thereat wherein it is provided that the corresponding provisions of the Patent Act will apply in a case of groundless thereat of the registered design.. It means that section 106 (power of court to grant relief in cases of groundless threats of infringement proceedings)  of the Patent Act 1970 would apply as it is in the case of groundless threat of Design. Thus it is obvious picture that section 106 of the Patent Act in the case of groundless threats of legal proceedings of registered designs would be applicable in like manner as they apply in the case of patents.

 Now plain reading of section 106 of the Patent Act inspires me to read the provisions of section 104 of the Patent Act for the issue whether the suit of  groundless threat would be transferred to the High Court or not in a like manner as the suit of infringement of design or patent is transferred when the defence of section 19 of the Designs Act or a counter claim for revocation under section 64 of the patent Act  is taken as the case may be.The reason behind reading section 104 is that it is connected with S.106. First part of Section 104 is for jurisdiction. There are three points covered in section 104.

(1) suit for declaration as to non- infringement under section 105 .
(2) suit for relief in cases of groundless threats  under section 106
(3) suit for infringement of patent

  Here for this article only point no. 2  is related as section 104 states that the suit for any relief under section 106 shall be instituted in District Court. Now the proviso of section 104 is very important which  states that if a counter-claim  for revocation of the patent is made by the defendant, the suit along with counter-claim shall be transferred to High Court for decision. Here the legislature is of the view that counter claim for revocation of the patent, shall be made against either of a suit of the above mentioned three points and not for any specific point otherwise that specific point would have been mentioned in the provision. For example, if counterclaim had been made only for infringement of patent, it would have been specifically mentioned in the section and therefore, the issue of applicability of counterclaim in proviso of Section 104 of the Patent Act  is with  either of  the three points mentioned herein above.
(It is hereby specified that that the provisions of counter claim are mentioned in Order 8 Rule 6-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908)

 Suppose a defendant of the case of groundless threat under S.106, institutes a counter-claim for revocation of the patent of the plaintiff, then the suit along with the counter-claim is transferred to the High Court for decision.  Moreover, as per the provisions of the sub-section 2 of  Section 106, the defendant of the suit for groundless threat has to prove that the plaintiff of that suit is infringing the patent.  On the other hand,  to establish the case of groundless threat, the onus is on the plaintiff  to show that the patent of the defendant,  is not valid to establish the case of groundless threat. Under such circumstances, can a defendant of the suit for groundless threat of patent institute a counterclaim of infringing the patent  ? , the answer is "YES' as per the provisions of section 104 read with section 106 of the Patent Act, 1970. It is stated that the suit for groundless threat is transferred to High Court from District Court in view of the counter claim being made by the defendant for infringement of patent.

Coming back to the main issue of the counterclaim in suit for groundless threat under section 23 of the  Designs Act 2000, it is said that the provisions of the Patent Act, 1970 are applied in respect of following points.

(1) certificates of the validity of a patent
(2) the remedy in case of groundless threats of legal proceedings by a patentee

Thus, for application of section 23 of the Designs Act in like manner of the provisions of the Patent Act , it is required to be considered in the manner mentioned as under.

(1) certificates of the registered design
(2) the remedy in the case of groundless threats of legal proceedings
(3) a proprietor of a design is in place of patentee
(4) a registered design is in place of patent
(5) a design is in place of invention


  Considering the above mentioned legal scenario in respect of a transfer of a suit for groundless threat under Designs Act, 2000,  I conclude with my opinion that  the above mentioned rule is applied to the suit for groundless threat of Design under Designs Act, 2000  in view of the provisions of section 106 read with section 104 of the Patent Act, 1970 which is related to section 23 of the Designs Act, 2000. Section 23 of the Designs Act,2000 is relied upon section 106 of the Patent Act 1970. If a counterclaim is instituted against the suit for  the groundless threat of patent , the suit along with counterclaim is transferred to High Court for decision as per section 104 of the Patent Act, then likewise, if a counterclaim is instituted against the suit for the groundless threat of Design, the said suit along with counterclaim is transferred to High Court as section 23 of the Designs Act is based on section 106 of the Patent Act and the heart of section 106 for transferring suit is section 104 of the Patent Act and therefore, in my opinion, the suit for groundless threat for Design under section 23 of the Designs Act is required to be transferred from District Court to High Court provided that the counter claim of infringement of registered Design is instituted against that suit for groundless threat.

Chirag Bhatt
IP Lawyer
09824025041 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        

Personal liberty of under trial prisoner vs. Interest of society & fair trial

As a lawyer, let me share something regarding personal liberty  of under trial accused  vs. public interest and fair trial in respect of bail in this article.

Personal liberty is undoubtedly a right of a person since his birth. It is established principle of law that personal liberty of under trial prisoner is a fundamental right under Article 21 of continuation of India.  However, the question  is that whether  this principle  is applicable  in respect of bail for non bailable offences , more particularly, in sessions  triable cases where to grant bail is purely  discretion of court and in the case where the accused threatens the witnesses and /or  the complainant of the case  for which  the accused has asked for bail. Here there are two aspects: one is discretion of Sessions Judge and other is threatens given by the accused to the person/s related to the prosecution case. Now, right to liberty is played a vital role when an under trial prisoner is jail due to prolonged delayed in prosecuting the case from prosecution side. It is a relevant point to be considered to enlarge the under trial prisoner on bail under the circumstances where prosecution is dragging the case due to any reason. The Court should, on the basis of the principle of personal liberty, enlarge the bail to the accused in such type of cases.
Now the question is whether the principle of personal liberty of under trial prisoner can be applicable for bail when the prisoner/ accused threatens the persons of prosecutions case and tries his best to hurdle the fair trial of the case by tampering with evidence of the prosecution case and where such personal liberty becomes harmful to the society at large ?  In another words whether fair trial is to be protected or personal liberty of such accused is protected is the pivotal issue in this article.   Let's me discuss this issue with relevant judgments.
In the case of Talab Haji Hussain vs. Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar reported in AIR 1958 SC 376 , the issue to be decided before Hon'ble Supreme Court was that  whether, in the case of a person accused of a bailable offence where bail has been granted to him under section 496 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it can be cancelled in a proper case by the High Court in exercise of its inherent power under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure? While adjudicating this issue, Hon'ble SC emphasizes on two material aspects of criminal trial. One is fair trial and the other is inherent power of the High Court while granting bail in non bailable or bailable offence by observing that " if a fair trial is the main objective of the criminal procedure, any threat to the continuance of a fair trial must be immediately arrested and the smooth progress of a fair trial must be ensured; and this can be done, if necessary, by the exercise of inherent power." The SC also observed that "... the primary object of criminal procedure is to ensure a fair trial of accused persons. Every criminal trial begins with the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused ; and provisions of the Code are so framed that a criminal trial should begin with and be throughout governed by this essential presumption ; but a fair trial has naturally two objects in view; it must be fair to the accused and must also be fair to the prosecution. The test of fairness in a criminal trial must be judged from this dual point of view. It is therefore of the utmost importance that, in a criminal trial, witnesses should be able to give evidence without any inducement or threat either from the prosecution or the defence. A criminal trial must never be so conducted by the prosecution as would lead to the conviction of an innocent person; similarly the progress of a criminal trial must not be obstructed by the accused so as to lead to the acquittal of a really guilty offender. The acquittal of the innocent and the conviction of the guilty are the objects of a criminal trial and so there can be no possible doubt that, if any conduct on the part of an accused person is likely to obstruct a fair trial, there is occasion for the exercise of the inherent power of the High Courts to secure the ends of justice. There can be no more important requirement of the ends of justice than the uninterrupted progress of a fair trial; and it is for the continuance of such a fair trial that the inherent powers of the High Courts are sought to be invoked by the prosecution in cases where it is alleged that accused persons, either by suborning or intimidating witnesses, are obstructing the smooth progress of a fair trial. Similarly, if an accused person who is released on bail jumps bail and attempts to run to a foreign country to escape the trial, that again would be a case where the exercise of the inherent power would be justified in order to compel the accused to submit to a fair trial and not to escape its consequences by taking advantage of the fact that he has been released on bail and by absconding to another country. In other words, if the conduct of the accused person subsequent to his release on bail puts in jeopardy the progress of a fair trial itself and if there is no other remedy which can be effectively used against the accused person, in such a case the inherent power of the High Court can be legitimately invoked.'' Thus in this Case Hon'ble SC confirmed the Order passed by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court by emphasizing fair trail against the personal liberty of the accused appellant even in the case of bailable offence as it was not safe to release the accused on bail on the basis of material on record as it is possibility on the part of the accused to create disturbance in fair trial of the case.
In another case of Shahzad Hasan Khan vs. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan reported in 1987 (2) SCC 684,  emphasizing on mass interest of the society, having come to know about the tempering the evidences on behalf of the accused person , the Hon'ble SC set aside the Order of granting bail passed by Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad, Lucknow Bench  by observing that "No doubt liberty of a citizen meat be zealously safeguarded by court, nonetheless when a person is accused of a serious offence like murder and his successive bail applications are rejected on merit there being prima facie material, the prosecution is entitled to place correct facts before the court. Liberty is to be secured through process of law, which is administered keeping in mind the interest of the accused, the near and dear of the victim who lost his life and who feel helpless and believe that there is no justice in the world as also the collective interest of the community so that parties do not lose faith in the institution and indulge in private retribution."
In a case, before Hon'ble Supreme Court, Masroor v. State of U.P. reported in 2009 (14) SCC 286 , SC beautified that there should be a balancing approach between personal liberty of the accused and interest of public and a case of prosecution. Further, Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a case Neeru Yadav vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in 2014(16) SCC 508 again  ardently discussed the aspect of balancing two interests by observing that "The sanctity of liberty is the fulcrum of any civilized society. It is a cardinal value on which the civilisation rests. It cannot be allowed to be paralysed and immobilized. Deprivation of liberty of a person has enormous impact on his mind as well as body. A democratic body polity which is wedded to rule of law, anxiously guards liberty. But, a pregnant and significant one, the liberty of an individual is not absolute. The society by its collective wisdom through process of law can withdraw the liberty that it has sanctioned to an individual when an individual becomes a danger to the collective and to the societal order. Accent on individual liberty cannot be pyramided to that extent which would bring chaos and anarchy to a society. A society expects responsibility and accountability from the member, and it desires that the citizens should obey the law, respecting it as a cherished social norm. No individual can make an attempt to create a concavity in the stem of social stream. It is impermissible. Therefore, when an individual behaves in a disharmonious manner ushering in disorderly things which the society disapproves, the legal consequences are bound to follow. At that stage, the Court has a duty. It cannot abandon its sacrosanct obligation and pass an order at its own whim or caprice. It has to be guided by the established parameters of law."
In a case State of Bihar vs. Rajballabh Prasad reported in 2017(3) GLR 2012 Hon'ble SC in paragraph no. 26 observed that if it is found that "there is a possibility of interdicting fair by the accused if released on bail, this public interest of fair trail would outweigh the personal interest of the accused while undertaking the task of balancing the liberty of the accused on the one hand and interest of the society to have a far trial on the other hand."
To conclude let it be said that  world history witnesses that there were many battles in the world for human liberty. The  personal liberty is the grammar of the human life. It is the most precious right not only given by law but also given by Nature. Personal liberty is a gift of Almighty.  Violation of such right is fatal to humanity. Everybody likes liberty. Nobody likes to be imprisoned and wishes to lose such a precious gem i.e. liberty of life. From right to  personal liberty to right to privacy of human  , Hon'ble SC has delivered its best verdicts. It is said that the man is a social animal. It means that a man is a pivotal part of society and society is the main part of the life of a man. A man has to follow that legal norms of the society. In the name of personal liberty, a person is not at all allowed to behave as if he likes to and such behaviour affects seriously on social and legal norms of society directly or indirectly.  In the interest of society and to protect the prosecution case from the hurdles created by the accused, the uncivilized liberty of such accused must be restrained by not granting bail as the factor of justice must be played with the victimized persons and there should be great lesson to be learnt to the accused of the heinous crimes. The society at large must be safe, secure and free from unwanted antisocial elements. I think this is the mottos of justice and law.

Chirag Bhatt

Lawyer

09824025041